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ABSTRACT
Macroeconomists——especially those studying monetary policy——often view the business cycle
as a transitory departure from the smooth evolution of a neoclassical growth model. Important ideas
contributed by Friedman, Lucas, and the developers of the sticky-price macro model generate this
type of aggregate behavior. But the real-business cycle model shows that the neoclassical model
implies anything but smooth growth. A purely neoclassical model, devoid of anything resembling
a business cycle in the sense of transitory departures from neoclassical equilibrium, nevertheless
explains most of the volatility of GDP growth at all frequencies. Monetary policymakers looking to
a neoclassical model to provide the neutral levels of key variables-potential GDP, the natural rate
of  unemployment,  and  the  equilibrium  real  interest  rate,  need  to  solve  a  complicated  and
controversial model to find these constructs. They cannot take average or smoothed values of actual
data to find them. Further, low-frequency movements of unemployment suggest a failure of the basic
idea that departures from the neoclassical equilibrium are transitory. I discuss new theories of the
labor market capable of explaining the low-frequency movements of unemployment. I conclude that
monetary policymakers should not try to discern neutral values of real variables. Some branches of
modem theory do not support the concepts of potential GDP, the natural rate of unemployment, and
the equilibrium real interest rate. Even the theories that do support the concepts suggest that







The U.S. economy rarely grows smoothly. Periods of variable but positive growth are
interrupted occasionally by contractions, usually brief. Macroeconomics is making some
progress in understanding the patterns of aggregate ﬂuctuations. The answers seem to be
anything but simple. The traditional notion no longer holds that the economy moves along
a smooth growth trend with temporary cyclical departures. This notion is badly incomplete
as a description of the data. Key variables—real GDP, unemployment, and real returns—
display important movements at frequencies below the business cycle but above long-term
trend. Modern macro theory helps explain these movements in a view that integrates them
with cyclical and trend movements.
Over the past half-century, macroeconomists have found the neoclassical model of the
economy useful. That model follows the principles of Solow’s growth model together with
standard ideas about clearing markets. The neoclassical model lacks a business cycle be-
cause it lacks the frictions and information limitations that modern macroeconomics ﬁnds
helpful in explaining transitory movements of employment and output. In a view that is
widespread today, the neoclassical model governs the evolution of the economy in all but
the short run—it provides a baseline for understanding macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
The view that the business cycle is an add-on to a smoothly evolving neoclassical econ-
omy has come under a double challenge. One challenge is factual. The decomposition of
variables into a trend and a cycle reveals important components that are neither trend nor
cycle. The other challenge comes from models. A macro model describes the effects of
exogenous driving forces on the key endogenous variables. The models under most active
debate today do not support the trend-cycle view.
One branch of the new learning emphasizes the volatility that a strictly neoclassical
model predicts, given the magnitudes of the shocks that hit the economy. The enduring
contribution of Kydland and Prescott’s real business cycle model was to make this point.
The RBC model emphasized the irregularity of productivity growth, but movements in ex-
2ogenous spending appear to be roughly equal contributors to the volatility of real GDP.
Much of that volatility, in fact, appears to come from the neoclassical mechanisms embod-
ied in the RBC model and not from the transitory departures from neoclassical equilibrium
that might be called the business cycle.
Another branch, particularly active in the past few years, builds a coherent view of
business-cycle facts that elude neoclassical explanation. This work focuses on the labor
market, though some of the new ideas might also help explain features of other markets.
Its primary objective is an understanding of unemployment, a concept not even considered
in the RBC model. The new work can be embodied in dynamic general-equilibrium mod-
els to develop hybrids, where volatility comes from movements of productivity, exogenous
spending, and other driving forces, ampliﬁed by variations in unemployment. This branch
of macro thinking disclaims the notion that the business cycle is an add-on to the neoclas-
sical model. Models instead deliver uniﬁed explanations of ﬂuctuations at all frequencies.
The traditional idea is that neoclassical constructs—production functions, consumption
demand functions, labor supply functions, embedded in markets that clear—describe the
actual operations of the economy in the longer run. There is a ¤-economy that generates
variables such as y¤, called potential GDP, u¤, called the natural unemployment rate, r¤,
called the natural real interest rate, and so on. Milton Friedman’s famous presidential
address, Friedman (1968), developed this idea informally. Lucas (1972) formalized the
idea in a particular way, in which the ¤-economy is one with full information and deviations
occur because of imperfect knowledge of the current state of the economy.
Deviations of the actual economy around the ¤-economy constitute the business cycle.
They arise from some kind of disequilibrium relative to the neoclassical equilibrium of the
¤-economy. As Lucas showed, the actual economy is in equilibrium, once limitations on
information are included in the model. When I refer to the transitory disequilibrium of the
business cycle, I mean speciﬁcally in relation to the neoclassical benchmark.
I draw an arbitrary line separating neoclassical principles from the full set of ideas that
3constitute modern economic science. Much of non-neoclassical economics, as I use the
term, involves imperfect information, as in Lucas’s model and in the worker-job matching
models that have added much to understanding of unemployment in recent years. Although
non-neoclassical economics is sometimes casual in stating its theories, the parts that I con-
sider here are just as rigorous as anything neoclassical.
In the early years of what Paul Samuelson called the “neoclassical synthesis,” the ¤-
economy was viewed as generating smooth trends, as described by Solow’s growth model,
the keystone of neoclassical macroeconomics. Short-run movements around the smooth
trend were transitory, the result of imperfect information, delayed adjustment of prices, or
other non-neoclassical features of the economy.
An important milestone in the unfolding breakdown of the neoclassical synthesis was
Kydland and Prescott (1982)’s discovery that the ¤-economy is anything but smooth, once
the actual volatility of productivity growth is included in the model. Their real business
cycle model generates substantial short-run volatility from relentlessly neoclassical princi-
ples. This discovery forbids extracting the disequilibrium cyclical movements as deviations
from a smooth trend. Instead, one would have to solve the ¤-model and calculate devia-
tions from the volatile ¤-variables. I’m not sure that this lesson has fully informed the
community of practical macroeconomists who try to use signal-extraction methods based
on statistical characterizations of the ¤-variables as moving smoothly over time.
The second element in the breakdown is the high persistence of the deviations of actual
from neoclassical performance. The puzzle is most visible in unemployment, a distinctly
non-neoclassical variable. Unemployment has large low-frequency swings—low in the
1950s and 1960s, high in the 1970s and 1980s, low again in the 1990s and 2000s. The
idea is unpalatable that these movements are the results of transitory cyclical forces, for
they are only barely transitory. The standard view that the ¤-economy explains longer-run
movements seems to call for adding low-frequency movements of unemployment to the
¤-economy—that is, to create a model of the natural rate of unemployment that permits
4slow-moving changes.
Unemployment is not a feature of any neoclassical economy. Explanations of even a
constant natural rate of unemployment invoke distinctly non-neoclassical mechanisms of
matching friction, the result of imperfect information among workers about available jobs
and among employers about available workers. Theories of matching and unemployment
do not deliver a distinction between transitory and slow-moving elements. They do not
contain an object called the natural rate. They are unitary theories of unemployment. A
careful look at detailed historical data ﬁnds no discrepancies—no special factors in the
1970s and 1980s that would boost unemployment. Rather, turnover in the labor market
was at normal levels in the 1970s and 1980s and unemployment was high because jobs
were harder to ﬁnd. The period resembled a long recession. The mechanism at work in a
recession is close to permanent, not transitory.
I conclude that neoclassical principles properly applied in an environment with volatile
driving forces delivers predictions rather different from the smooth growth implicit in
most thinking based on the cycle over trend model. Sudden movements of GDP and
other variables are not necessarily part of the disequilibrium business cycle—they may
reﬂect the neoclassical response to shifts in productivity and exogenous spending. And
non-neoclassical forces in the labor market may result in long-lasting, smooth changes in
unemployment that are not distinguishable from the more rapid movements that observers
have earlier assigned to transitory disequilibrium.
Building new models of the labor market that come to grips with the observed level of
volatility of employment and unemployment is an active current area of research. Subtle
changes in the economic environment, such as changes in the distribution of information
known to one side of the employment bargain but not to the other, can cause large changes
in unemployment. And these changes can be long-lasting—they may play an important
role in the sub-cyclical movements of the labor market that are so prominent in the data but
escape explanation in existing models.
5Although research on the puzzles of ﬁnancial returns is even more active than in labor-
market volatility, I am not conﬁdent that we are making as much progress. Even the sim-
plest observations, such as the equity premium, defy explanation even from new ideas. And
the volatility of the stock market is far, far above the prediction of any sensible general-
equilibrium macro-ﬁnance model.
The conduct of monetary policy is generally outside the scope of this paper. Some of
the lessons are worth mentioning brieﬂy. The traditional view encouraged policymakers to
think that the ¤-economy delivers normal or neutral values of real variables. The idea was
that these reveal the stance of the economy and of policy. If unemployment exceeds the
natural rate, real GDP falls short of potential, and the real interest rate is below its natural
level, then the economy is in a cyclical slump and the stimulus of the low interest rate is
appropriate. As unemployment and output return to their ¤ levels, monetary policy should
move into neutral and the interest rate should be moved to its neutral, ¤ level, according to
the neoclassical synthesis.
The new view makes real variables less useful in the formulation of monetary policy.
Only an elaborate, realistic version of the RBC model can deliver values of y¤ and r¤ that
take proper account of the movements of productivity and exogenous spending. Even that
model does not know how to deal with movements of unemployment. New thinking about
unemployment is far too primitive to help in that area, and, in any case, does not support
the whole idea of constructing u ¡ u¤. I believe that the idea of a ¤-model will gradually
disappear from macroeconomics and from policy making.
The Taylor rule has proven an exceptionally useful tool for describing monetary policy.
A generic rule might be written
rt = ar
¤
t + b(¼t ¡ ¼
¤) + c(ut ¡ u¤) + drt¡1 (1)
Here ¼t is the rate of inﬂation and ¼¤ is the target rate of inﬂation. The presence of r¤ and u¤
(or y¤) in the Taylor rule creates problems according to the evidence and thinking discussed
in this paper. Even in a model where these constructs are meaningful, evaluating them in
6real time is likely to involve serious errors. And the correct model may not involve ¤-
variables at all. The new view points in the direction of a Taylor rule that adapts the interest
rate to inﬂation (positive b), but does not use a base or neutral value of the real interest rate
(a = 0) and does not try to respond to cyclical variables such as the unemployment gap
(c = 0). Rather than set the interest rate to a measure of the neutral real interest rate, the
Taylor rule would raise the nominal rate from its earlier value whenever inﬂation threatened
to exceed its target (d = 1).
2 Sources of Volatility
2.1 Decomposing the sources of volatility in real GDP
I begin by demonstrating—in a model-free environment—the basic point that neoclassical
forces, notably productivity growth, predict a good deal of volatility. The ¤-economy does
not evolve along a smooth trend.
Solow’s growth decomposition provides a good framework demonstrating this point
with respect to the sources of movements in real GDP:
¢Yt = ¢At + ®t¢Nt + (1 ¡ ®t)¢Kt (2)
Here Yt is real GDP, At is an index of productivity, Nt is annual hours of work adjusted for
quality, Kt is the ﬂow of capital services, and ®t is labor’s share in factor income, taken as
an estimate of the elasticity of output with respect to hours of work. ¢ is the annual percent
rate of growth of the corresponding variable.
Quality-adjusted hours of work further decompose as
¢Nt = ¢Lt + ¢Pt + ¢(1 ¡ ut) + ¢Ht + ¢Qt (3)
Here Lt is the size of the working-age population, Pt is the labor-force participation rate, ut




























































































Figure 1. Components of Output Growth, 1948-2002
of work, derived from the education mix of workers. Thus one can examine a seven-factor
breakdown of the sources of ﬂuctuations in output:
¢yt = ¢At + ®t(¢Lt + ¢Pt + ¢(1 ¡ ut) + ¢Ht + ¢Qt) + (1 ¡ ®t)¢Kt (4)
The Bureau of Labor Statistics prepares data on the total private economy based on a
detailed application of Solow’s method. Figure 1 shows the growth of the log of output
and the seven components for the period since 1948. Figure 2 shows the same data after
removing a linear trend from each series.
One of the most striking features of the data is the large role of productivity in output
ﬂuctuations. Figure 2 shows that productivity grows along anything but a smooth path of
constant increase. Fluctuations in productivity are important at low, medium, and high fre-
quencies. The variables most closely associated with normal ideas of the business cycle—































































































Figure 2. Detrended Components of Output Growth, 1948-2002







Output growth Bureau of Labor Statistics, Multi-factor 
Productivity Index, Private Business
Productivity growth Bureau of Labor Statistics, Multi-factor 
Productivity Index, Private Business
1 48 52 60
Growth of working-age population Bureau of Labor Statistics, Multi-factor 
Productivity Index, Private Business
Labor share -4 -4 4
Growth of labor-force participation 
rate
Current Population Survey,  Labor Force Divided 
by Civilian Non-Institutional Population
Labor share 0 2 1
Growth of employment rate, 1 - 
unemployment rate
Current Population Survey,  Employment Divided
by Labor Force
Labor share 18 21 24
Growth of hours per worker Bureau of Labor Statistics, Multi-factor 
Productivity Index Data, Private Business
Labor share 17 15 13
Growth of quality of the average hour 
of work
Residual from  Multi-factor Productivity Index, 
Private Business, Hours of Work with Quality 
Adjustment and Bureau of Labor Statistics, Major 
Sector Productivity Data, Private Business, Hours 
of Work
Labor share 7 4 -1
Growth of capital services Bureau of Labor Statistics, Multi-factor 
Productivity Index Data, Private Business
1 - labor share 12 10 -2
Contribution (percent)
Table 1. Decomposition of Sources of Variation in Output Growth, 1948-2002
story of short-run ﬂuctuations. And those two variables have important lower-frequency
movements.
I measure the contributionsof the variancesof annual growthof the variouscomponents
by their covariances with output growth. This gives an exact additive decomposition of
explanatory contributions to the variance of growth. I measure growth over 1-, 3-, and
7-year periods. Table 1 shows the results.
Almost half of the variance of annual output growth arises from the variance of produc-
tivity growth, according to Table 1. This ﬁgure is biased upward to some extent because the
BLS measures productivity growth as a residual from measured output growth, so errors in
output growth appear in both variables and bias the covariance upward. A second source
of bias is the endogenous response of productivity arising from increasing returns or un-
measured changes in capital utilization. Nonetheless, by all appearances, variations in the
10rate of productivity growth are a major source of variations in GDP growth. Not surpris-
ingly, productivity growth variability accounts for an even larger fraction of the variability
of output growth over 3- and 7-year periods.
Population, labor-force participation, and labor-quality growth have small variances, so
they account for little of the variation in output growth. Variation in growth of the capital
stock accounts for a moderate amount of output variability for 1- and 3-year differences,
but essentially none for 7-year differences.
The two cyclical variables, the employment rate and hours per worker, jointly account
for about a third of the variability of annual output growth. As expected for a cyclical
variable, variations in hours per worker account for less of the variation in 3- and 7-year
changes in output than for 1-year changes. But the same is not true for the employment
rate. Its role in output variability is actually a little higher for the longer differences.
Table 1 little resembles the ﬁndings for an economy with smooth underlying growth
buffeted by transitory recessions and recoveries. Smooth productivity growth would have
little volatility in 1-year changes, so it would not account for much of the variability of
annual growth of output. Transitory cyclical variables—the employment rate and hours—
would have large roles in annual differences. For 7-year changes, on the other hand, the
transitory components would have little role, and variations in productivity growth, though
small, would account for all of the similar variations in output growth.
As Figure 2 demonstrates, the primary reason for the ﬁndings of Table 1 is that all of the
components of output growth are quite persistent. The main difference between productiv-
ity and the employment rate, for example, is that productivity is much more volatile. The
persistence of ﬂuctuations is comparable between the two variables. Consequently, Table
1 does not assign high explanatory power to variations in the employment rate for 1-year
differences and high power to variations in productivity growth for long differences.
112.2 Volatility in macroeconomic models
Next I will investigate the potential volatilities of a model of a neoclassical economy and a
model of an economy with the same fundamentals but with frictions in its labor market. I
will compare both volatilities to those of the U.S. economy over the past half-century.
Table 2 shows the standard deviations of key macro variables over the period 1947
through 2004. The variables are chosen to describe a non-stationary economy—one with
stochastic variations in its growth rate—but with a stationary unemployment rate and sta-
tionary exogenous disturbances to spending. The U.S. economy ﬁts this description. The
ﬁrst two rows describe two major driving forces, productivity and exogenous spending.
The latter is the sum of government purchases of goods and services and net exports, stated
as a ratio to consumption. Both exogenous spending and consumption are non-stationary,
but the ratio is stationary though quite persistent. I take net exports as exogenous, though
of course in the global view they are endogenous. Much of the volatility of exogenous
spending arises from military spending, reasonably taken to be exogenous.
Kydland and Prescott (1982) revolutionized thinking about the behavior of the aggre-
gate neoclassical model. Prior to their real business cycle or RBC model, the neoclassical
model took the form of a growth model, with smooth exponential growth of population and
productivity. Kydland and Prescott found that ﬂuctuations in productivity of realistic mag-
nitude induced realistic movements of some macro variables, including real GDP. As I will
demonstrate shortly, this ﬁnding holds for conventional values of parameters, including the
elasticity of labor supply. Kydland and Prescott found that explaining the observed volatil-
ity of employment required highly elastic labor supply, a controversial property. Their need
to assert unrealistically elastic labor supply derives from their neglect of unemployment, I
believe.
Hall (2005d) describes an aggregate modeling framework suited to the investigation of
volatility. Here I start with a version of the model that is strictly neoclassical. The model
resemblesKydlandandPrescott’sinmostrespects, exceptthatIuseastandardspeciﬁcation
12Variable Data source Units Value
Productivity growth Bureau of Labor Statistics, Multi-factor 
Productivity Index, Private Business
Quarterly standard 
deviation, percent, 




Government purchases plus net 
exports relative to consumption
Bureau of Economic Analysis, National 
Income and Product Accounts, Table 
1.1.5. Nominal Gross Domestic Product
Standard deviation 
of quarterly data, 
percent
5.01
GDP growth Bureau of Economic Analysis, National 
Income and Product Accounts,Table 
1.1.3. Real Gross Domestic Product, 
Quantity Indexes
Standard deviation 
of quarterly data, 
percent
1.00
Consumption growth Bureau of Economic Analysis, National 
Income and Product Accounts,Table 
1.1.3. Real Gross Domestic Product, 
Quantity Indexes
Standard deviation 
of quarterly data, 
percent
0.85
Investment/capital ratio Growth ratio of the real capital stock 
from Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
Fixed Asset Tables, Table 1.2. Chain-
Type Quantity Indexes for Net Stock of 
Fixed Assets and Consumer Durable 
Goods
Standard deviation 
of annual data, 
divided by 4, percent
0.22
Unemployment Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Unemployment rate, 16 years and older
Standard deviation 
of quarterly data, 
percent
1.53
Table 2. Volatility of Macro Variables, 1948-2002
13for capital adjustment costs in place of their speciﬁcation with time to build (this difference
has almost no effect on the results). The most important difference from Kydland and
Prescott’s work is that labor supply is inelastic. I calculate the exact equilibrium of the
stochastic model, rather than using a log-linearization. For many purposes a log-linear
approximation is perfectly satisfactory, but not for the measurement of volatility.
In the model, consumers live forever and make consumption plans that maximize ex-
pected utility. Utility each period is a constant-elastic function of consumption. The in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution is 0.4 and the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion is
2.5. The technology is Cobb-Douglas. Each person works the same amount each quarter,
independent of the wage or the person’s wealth. Capital accumulation incurs quadratic ad-
justment costs such that the quarterly growth rate of capital is one-third of the deviation of
Tobin’s q from one. All of these parameter values are standard.
A productivity shock with a mean of 0.33 percent and a quarterly standard deviation of
0.94percentdisturbstheeconomyeachquarter. Theshocksarecumulative, sothatthelevel
of productivity is a random walk with upward drift. An exogenous spending shock with a
mean of 32 percent of consumption and a standard deviation of 5 percent of consumption
also disturbs the economy. The shock is highly persistent but eventually dies away. The
means, standard deviations, and persistence of the two shocks match the data underlying
Table 2.
Table3showsthevolatilitiesofthekeyvariables. Theﬁrstcolumnrepeatsthemeasures
from Table 2. The second column shows the computed volatilities from the neoclassical
model. The model falls a little short in matching the volatility of output. It overstates the
volatility of consumption by about the same amount. It also overstates the volatility of
investment somewhat. None of these failings is very serious. With plausible modiﬁcations
the neoclassical model could match the volatility of output, consumption, and investment
essentially perfectly. The neoclassical model matches those volatilities reasonably well








Output growth 1.00 0.84 0.83
Consumption growth 0.85 1.06 1.03
Investment/capital ratio 0.22 0.26 0.25
Unemployment 1.53 0.00 1.55
Standard deviations
Table 3. Volatilities of Key Macro Variables, Two Models Compared to Actual
cle. Employment remains a constant fraction of the population and unemployment remains
at zero at all times in the model.
The right-hand column reports on the properties of a non-neoclassical model that shares
many of the same elements and parameter values of the neoclassical model, but includes a
speciﬁcation of the labor market with endogenous and quite variable unemployment. The
production function and preferences in the model are the same as before, but the labor
market has important limitations on information. I will spell out more of the details of the
model in a later section. The calibration of the model places the average unemployment
rate at its historical level of 5.5 percent and also matches the observed volatility of about
1.5 percentage points.
The key point of Table 3 is that adding a realistic speciﬁcation of the labor market does
not make much difference for the implied volatility of GDP, consumption, or investment,
even though it helps a lot with respect to the volatility of unemployment. Adding variable
employment actually reduces the volatility of output growth by a tiny bit, but this ﬁnding
should not be taken seriously, because it rests on the extreme assumption of zero elasticity
of labor supply. Rather, the conclusion is that employment variation is likely to be a small
15part of the total picture of the volatility of output growth. There is much more to the story
of output growth than the business cycle captured by unemployment ﬂuctuations.
The ﬁnding that much of the volatility of the economy arises from neoclassical sources
greatly complicates the extraction of the transitory cyclical components of the movements
of macro variables. The ¤-economy captured by the middle column of Table 3 is hardly a
smoothtrend. Mostoftheactionintheeconomyarisesfromsourcesotherthanthebusiness
cycle.
3 Properties of Key Macro Variables
This section takes a closer look at three macro variables that play key roles in discussions
of monetary policy, especially in connection with the Taylor rule. Some forms of the rule
call for the central bank to set an interest rate based on a measure of the position of the
economy in the business cycle—the gap between real GDP and potential or the deviation
of unemployment from the natural rate—and also based on a measure of the neutral level
of the real interest rate. Studying the histories of the variables illustrates the challenges in
providing these measures.
3.1 Real GDP
Figure 3 shows real GDP in terms of the deviation of its log from a linear trend. I remove
thetrendtobringoutthecyclicalandsub-cyclicalmovements. Thebusinesscycleisreadily
apparent in Figure 10. In addition, real GDP has large sub-cyclical movements.
The normal or neutral level of real GDP is usually called potential GDP. Many discus-
sions relate potential GDP to the level predicted by a neoclassical ¤-model. In practice,
however, potential GDP is often taken as the smooth component of a two-component sta-
tistical decomposition, where the second component is the business cycle. The Hodrick-
Prescott ﬁlter is spectacularly successful in separating an historical series for real GDP into



























































































































Figure 3. Deviations of Log Real GDP around a Linear Trend
17Orphanides and van Norden (2002) investigate smoothing methods, including Hodrick-
Prescott, for recovering potential GDP in real time, as required for use in a Taylor rule.
They demonstrate the difﬁculty of extracting the current value of the smooth trend from
just past data. The great success of Hodrick-Prescott comes in part from its use of future
data—it is a two-sided ﬁlter. Data revisions are also a major issue for calculating output
gaps in real time.
The results in Section 2 cast serious doubt on the smoothing or signal-extraction ap-
proach to determining potential GDP and thus the GDP gap. The neoclassical model does
not predict that GDP will evolve smoothly. Instead, one would need to solve the neoclassi-
cal model to obtain Y ¤
t , a volatile series. Notice that Kydland and Prescott studied data after
applying the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. They interpreted the higher-frequency movements of
output remaining after ﬁltering as the equilibrium of their neoclassical RBC model, not
deviations from a neoclassical equilibrium. Even macroeconomists like myself who ﬁnd
room for improvement in the RBC model’s treatment of the labor market ﬁnd persuasive
the RBC model’s showing that a neoclassical model predicts substantial volatility of output.
My conclusion is that a central bank should not try to compute a GDP gap in real time
and adjust monetary policy according to the current gap. Smoothing approaches to deﬁning
potential GDP fail to consider the strong evidence that potential GDP—if there is such a
thing—is volatile, not smooth. Macroeconomics is far from having delivered a workable,
real-time measurement process for potential GDP.
3.2 Unemployment
Figure 4 shows the unemployment rate over the entire period that it has been measured
by the current method based on a household survey. The business cycle is a conspicuous
feature of the movements of unemployment—each recession results in a spike of unem-
ployment. The series has no trend over nearly 60 years. But unemployment has substantial




























































































































Figure 4. Unemployment Rate, 1948-2004
1968, high again around 1980, and recently low again.
The ﬁgure makes it clear that something more than a simple transitory business cy-
cle drives unemployment. Persistent inﬂuences are at work as well. One of them is
demographics—the baby-boom generation caused a bulge of unemployment as it went
through its high-unemployment years in the late 1970s. But Figure 5 shows that other
highly persistent forces are at work as well. It adjusts unemployment for the age composi-
tion of the labor force by taking a ﬁxed-weight index of age-speciﬁc unemployment rates.
The weights reﬂect the composition of the labor force in the middle year of the data, 1975.
Even with the demographic adjustment, unemployment was high for an extended period in
the 1970s and 1980s.
I will ultimately argue against the two-component view of unemployment, where it is




























































































































Figure 5. Unemployment Rate, Adjusted for Age Composition, 1948-2004
20Prescott ﬁlter does a marvelous job of ﬁnding two such components from historical data.
Staiger, Stock and Watson (1997) estimate a two-component model in a more structural
framework, where the transitory component obeys the Phillips-curve principle that inﬂation
rises when unemployment falls below the natural rate. They warn against relying on their
estimates of the natural rate in real time—their method yields estimates of the current
natural rate with large standard errors.
3.3 The real interest rate
The real interest rate displays similar puzzles to those just documented for output and
unemployment. The idea that the real interest rate has a stable value r¤ and transitory
cyclical ﬂuctuations receives even less support than does the same idea for unemployment.
Discussion of the real rate is further complicated by the wide variety of ways to measure the
concept. Nominal short interest rates have expected real levels and realized real levels. The
market for price-level-protected treasury debt gives direct measures of real rates. Longer
debt has a real yield and real holding-period returns. The stock market has short-, medium-,
and long-period real returns. The real return to capital can be measured from a residual or
from a model of the marginal product of capital. And the marginal rate of substitution of
consumers between this year and the next is another measure that should reveal real returns.
The following equation from macro-ﬁnance, embodying the consumption capital-asset







The left side is the ratio of the current to the future price of consumption and the right
side is the marginal rate of substitution. Speciﬁcally, the left side is the real return earned
over a speciﬁed holding period. In the results I present, the holding period will be a year.
The subscript i indexes the wide variety of assets available to the household—debt, equity,






describes the marginal rate of substitution, down to a constant. The parameter ¾ is the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The parameters ki describe the differences in risk
and therefore return across the assets. Their overall level depends on the volatility of con-
sumption and the rate of impatience. The random variable ²i;t is the surprise in the relation,
arising from new information that affects the realized return and next year’s consumption.
See Hansen and Singleton (1983) for a discussion of the underpinnings of this equation.
I will investigate two ideas about real returns that might be useful in determining neutral
or normal levels of returns. One is that a given return is reasonably described by a normal
level r¤
i plus an expectation error. In this view, the common element in returns suggested
by the consumption growth term in equation (5) is taken to be unimportant (¾ large). The
second idea is that returns do contain a common source of variation over time. Finance
models have this implication. Because those models do not necessarily relate the common
time element to the rate of growth of consumption, I will consider an approach that does
not assume that the element takes that form.
Table 4 presents basic data on a number of returns and on the marginal rate of substitu-
tion. It shows the standard deviation of the variable, the mean over about the past 50 years,
and the standard error of the estimated mean. All of the returns are for one-year holding
periods and all are measured as the number of units of consumption achieved by giving up
one unit of consumption, investing the proceeds in the asset, and then selling the position
and converting back to consumption goods a year later. The variables include two returns
to capital. The ﬁrst takes the earnings of capital as the residual, the difference between
the corporate sector’s revenue and its non-capital costs. I adjust for corporate taxation, for
depreciation, and adjustment costs. The details of the construction of this series appear in
Hall (2003). The second measures the return from the marginal product of capital. For a






Realized return to one-year treasury bills 1954-2004 Nominal return on one-year treasury bills 
adjusted for change in the NIPA price index for 
consumption
2.4 2.08 0.34
Realized residual return to corporate 
capital
1947-2001 Hall (2003) 2.8 4.49 0.38
Return to capital inferred from marginal 
product of capital
1948-2002 Marginal product of capital estimated by 
equating the Cobb-Douglas marginal product 
(the output/capital ratio) to the rental price of 
capital and solving for the return
1.9 8.03 0.26
Realized real return over one-year 
holding period, S&P 500
1947-2004 From Robert Shiller, 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm
15.5 9.51 2.13
Annual marginal rate of substitution 1948-2001 Equation (5) in this paper, using rate of growth 
of consumption from NIPA; sigma=0.4
7.8 10.39 0.91
Table 4. Data on Five Variables that Record Real Returns





where ®, as before, is the elasticity of output with respect to labor, p is the price of output,
and K is the capital stock. To derive the return to capital from the value of the marginal
product, I equate the latter to the rental price of capital and solve for the return.
Table 4 reveals some of the standard puzzles of ﬁnance. The standard deviation of the
return to the stock market is vastly greater than the standard deviation of the returns to the
underlying activities, as measured by either of the measures of the return to capital. The
suspicion of excess volatility of the stock market arises. The average return to the stock
market much exceeds the return to treasury bills—the difference is the notorious equity
premium.
The standard errors in the right-most column of the table show that 50 years of data
is enough to give reasonably precise measures of the long-run normal value of the real
treasury-bill return and the two measures of the return to capital. If it were true that these
returns consisted of a constant and a random surprise, the constant would be well-measured
23and provide a reliable benchmark for a neutral interest rate or return. But, as I show next,
that model does not remotely ﬁt the facts.
The standard errors are much larger for the return to the stock market and for the
marginal rate of substitution. Neither is particularly informative about the normal level
of real returns.
Figures 6 through 9 show data on annual realized returns for the various assets and
Figure 10 shows the realized marginal rate of substitution. Figure 6 plots the realized real
return to one-year treasury bills. To the naked eye, the plot suggests that the return has
properties in common with the unemployment rate—in addition to transitory movements
lasting only a couple of years, the return has changes in level lasting for a decade or two.
In particular, returns averaged around zero until the late 1970s, rose to high levels, then
declined gradually down to current levels around zero again. Only a major feat of signal
extraction could ﬁnd the time-varying neutral or natural or normal level of this return.
Figure 7 shows that much the same conclusion follows for the realized return on corporate
capital. Inadditiontooccasionalsuddenmovementsofseveralpercentagepoints, thereturn
has low-frequency movements, high in the 1970s, low in the 1980s, and high again since
1995. Figure 8 provides a related measure with its own low-frequency movements, based
on the marginal product of capital. Because this measure is not a residual, it has lower
volatility. But it plainly is not a constant plus a serially uncorrelated surprise. Again, signal
extraction would be required to determine its normal value. Figure 9 shows the realized
real return on the S&P 500. In addition to the large annual deviations demonstrated in
Table 4, the plot suggests a low-frequency component, declining during the ﬁrst half of
the period and rising during the second half. Figure 10 shows the realized marginal rate
of substitution, the ﬁnal candidate to provide a benchmark for the normal level of the real
return. It has no visible low-frequency movements, but its volatility is far too high to be
useful as a benchmark.
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Figure 8. Realized Real Return on Capital, Based on Cobb-Douglas Marginal
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Figure 10. Realized Marginal Rate of Substitution, 1948-2001
29Variable
Probability that the series is a 
constant plus independent 
disturbances
Probability that the difference 
between the series and the 
treasury-bill return is a constant 
plus independent disturbances
Probability that the difference 
between the series and the 
marginal rate of substitution is 
a constant plus independent 
disturbances
Realized return to one-year treasury bills 0.0191 0.2108
Realized residual return to corporate 
capital
0.0822 0.0003 0.3756
Return to capital inferred from marginal 
product of capital
0.0000 0.0000 0.2364
Realized real return over one-year 
holding period, S&P 500
0.3232 0.5124 0.7367
Annual marginal rate of substitution 0.3757 0.2108
Table 5. Tests of the Hypothesis that Returns Have Natural Levels
tests a simple property of a time series that comprises a constant and a serially uncorrelated
disturbance. The deviations of the series from its calculated mean should change sign
about half the time. The distribution of sign changes would be binomial except for the step
of subtracting the mean, which has the effect of slightly increasing the frequency of sign
changes. I obtained the null distribution by bootstrap. The table reports p values for three
sets of hypotheses. The left column in the table considers the simple model that each series
is a constant plus an independent disturbance. The entry is the probability that the observed
number of sign changes could have arisen from data obeying serial independence (the test
is two-tailed, so the probability includes the possibility of the observed amount of positive
serial correlation, with few sign changes, and negative serial correlation, with many sign
changes). The hypothesis is soundly rejected for treasury bills and fairly strongly rejected
for the residual return to capital. The test casts some suspicion for the stock market return
and the marginal rate of substitution.
The middle column of Table 5 considers whether the time-varying element predicted by
ﬁnance theory accounts for the rejections in the ﬁrst column. Because all returns contain
the same time-varying component, the difference between any pair should be serially un-
30correlated. I subtract the treasury bill rate from each of the other series and apply the same
test based on sign changes. The hypothesis is rejected decisively for the two returns to cap-
ital and moderately for the marginal rate of substitution. Similar results have been found in
previous work, starting with Hansen and Singleton (1983). The slow-moving components
visible in the ﬁgures differ across series. The obstacle to ﬁnding a benchmark is more than
just accounting for a common slow-moving element.
The right-hand column in the table subtracts the marginal rate of substitution from each
of the returns. Because of the high volatility of the marginal rate of substitution, the results
are not deﬁnitive, but raise the suspicion that the slow-moving component in each return is
not the same as the one in the marginal rate of substitution (if there is one in that series).
These results suggest that macro and ﬁnance have yet to reach anything like the state
of development where a measure of the normal level of any real interest rate is empirically
useful or reliable. All measures of the real rate tell different stories.
4 New Thinking about Macro Fluctuations
A large amount of macro model-building continues to superimpose a transitory cycle on
a neoclassical ¤-economy. These models generally assume that sellers—either producers
or workers—agree to provide the quantity that buyers choose, given a price or wage that
is sticky for a period of time. The ¤-economy is the same economy without any price-
wage stickiness. Because each price or wage adjusts to its ¤-level after a year or two,
the economy tends back to its ¤-equilibrium. The deviations around that equilibrium are
transitory. Woodford (2003) describes the state of this art and relates it in great detail to
monetary policy making.
Becausethis classof models givesthepurchaser a calloption on thequantity transacted,
I call it the call-option sticky-price model. Its proponents have put vastly more effort into
rationalizing and documenting the stickiness of prices and wages than into rationalizing
and documenting the call-option aspect of the relation between buyer and seller. In product
31markets, one can identify some markets, such as regulated utilities, where the price is set
for a period and the buyer chooses the quantity. In retail commerce, merchants set prices
and generally ﬁll the demand that materializes, but the period over which prices are sticky
is short in relation to the duration of cyclical ﬂuctuations. In most parts of the labor market,
in almost all intermediate product markets, and in some consumer markets, prices are set
in idiosyncratic bargains between buyers and sellers, and the buyer has no call option.
The call option is central to the ability of this class of models to describe the busi-
ness cycle, because it results in volatility of unemployment and other cyclical variables. If
workers and employers made contracts that speciﬁed both the price and the volume trans-
acted, rather than leaving volume to be determined later, employment and output would not
change during the contract. Such an economy would have a puzzle of the excess stability
of employment and output, hardly the issue with the U.S. economy.
Barro (1977) made a trenchant criticism of the call-option aspect of the call-option
sticky-price model, to which the proponents have not made an effective response, in my
view. The call option is not the natural structure for the bilateral relation between buyer
and seller. Call options of sufﬁcient duration to match the duration of business cycles do
not seem to be widespread; indeed, I might go farther to say that they hardly seem to exist at
all. But it is not my purpose here to criticize the call-option sticky-price model, but rather to
discuss emerging thinking about other non-neoclassical explanations of macro ﬂuctuations.
The new thinking views buyers and sellers as making bilateral bargains. It dispenses with
the call option of earlier cycle models, but may retain sticky prices and wages.
The new thinking concentrates on the labor market, but many of its ideas might apply
in product markets, especially intermediate product markets. A great deal of progress has
occurred in recent years in understanding unemployment, mostly in partial-equilibrium
analysis. General-equilibrium analysis incorporating the new ideas generally conﬁrms that
the insights from partial-equilibrium models carry over.
The equilibria of the new models do not take the form of the equilibrium of the neo-
32classical model perturbed by a transitory cyclical component. In this respect they differ
fundamentally from the model implicit in Friedman’s presidential address, from Lucas’s
misperceptions model, and from the now dominant call-option sticky-price model. The
new models do not have a natural unemployment rate, a potential level of GDP, or a normal
real interest rate.
4.1 The matching model of unemployment
Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1985) (DMP) launched the view that
now accounts for most thinking about unemployment. The model focuses on the employ-
ment-unemployment margin and usually takes labor supply in the sense of participation to
be inelastic with respect to the payoff from participation. Wage elasticity is easy to add to
the model.
In the DMP family of models, the labor market is in continuous equilibrium. No player
waits to change a price or allocation once the change is merited. Unemployment arises
because job-seekers and prospective employers encounter frictions that limit their ﬂows of
meetings. When a job-seeker does meet an employer, the two determine if their prospective
relationship has a surplus. The job-seeker’s reservation wage is the wage of the job fore-
gone by taking the current job. The employer’s reservation wage is the net productivity of
the job-seeker in the employer’s job. The surplus is the difference between the employer’s
reservation wage and the job-seeker’s, if the difference is positive. Having found a positive
surplus, the pair make a bargain and the job begins. The worker remains in the job until
the surplus evaporates. The relation between the worker and the employer is bilaterally
efﬁcient.
Employers decide upon a level of recruiting effort—they expend resources whenever
the gain from adding another worker exceeds the cost of the effort required to get in touch
with the worker. A matching technology relates the job-ﬁlling rate to the resources ex-
pended by employers. The job-ﬁnding rate—the monthly probability that a job-seeker will
33be matched to an employer with a suitable job—moves in the direction opposite from the
job-ﬁlling rate. If employers are deploying low levels of effort, jobs are hard to ﬁnd and
the job-ﬁnding rate is low. The job-ﬁlling rate is correspondingly high, as employers ﬁnd
that candidates for openings are plentiful.
Unemploymentdependsnegativelyonthejob-ﬁndingrateandpositivelyonthejob-loss
rate. Except for unimportant transition effects immediately after one of the rates changed,
two equations determine the unemployment rate:
unemployment entry rate = separation rate £ fraction becoming unemployed (8)
+ LF entry rate £ fraction becoming unemployed
u =
unemployment entry rate
unemployment entry rate + job-ﬁnding rate
: (9)
Here the separation rate is the fraction of workers who lose or leave their jobs each period.
The LF entry rate is the ﬂow of people into the labor force.
Hall (2005c) reviews a variety of data sources that appear to agree that the separation
rate is essentially a constant. Although job losses rise in a recession, the increase is tiny
in relation to the high normal levels of separations, which run more than 3 percent per
month. The entry rate to unemployment rises in recessions not because of higher separa-
tions but because those separated are more likely to enter unemployment rather than move
directly to new jobs and those entering the labor force are more likely to transit through
unemployment.
The job-ﬁnding rate and its close cousins, the fractions of separators and entrants who
become unemployed, are the key determinants of the unemployment rate. In strong mar-
kets, the job-ﬁnding rate is high and the fractions who become unemployed are low, so
unemployment is low.
The labor market is in equilibrium when employers gain the same amount from a new
hire as they pay for the recruiting effort that results in the hire. The market is continuously
in this equilibrium. The employer’s gain from a match is the productivity of the match less
34the wage paid to the worker. Thus the wage is a central determinant of unemployment. If
thewageishigh, theemployer’sincentivetocreateajobandexpendeffortstoﬁllitissmall.
A high wage across the labor market will result in an equilibrium with high unemployment.
Fluctuations in wages will result in movements in unemployment. So will ﬂuctuations in
productivity if the wage does not change to offset the ﬂuctuations.
What forces determine the wage? At the most fundamental level of economic logic, the
wage bargain is indeterminate over a range. Employer and job-seeker enjoy a prospective
surplus. Any wage between the job-seeker’s reservation wage (the opportunity cost) and
the employer’s reservation wage (productivity) will split the surplus and create a bargain
that makes both parties better off than they would be if they failed to make the match. A
wage-determination mechanism overcomes the indeterminacy by assigning a wage that lies
within the bargaining set.
Until quite recently, models in the DMP tradition assumed that the parties split the
difference by setting a wage that is a weighted average of the two reservation wages. This
wage-determination rule guarantees that the wage lies within the bargaining set. It turns
out to make the wage highly ﬂexible. For simplicity, I will assume that the weights are the
same and thus equal to 1/2. When productivity falls, the employer’s reservation wage falls
by the same amount. On this account, the wage falls by half the amount of the productivity
decline. But the job-seeker’s reservation wage then falls as well because it depends on
wages at other jobs. In the new equilibrium, the wage falls by essentially the same as
the decline in productivity. The employer’s gain remains close to the same and nothing
much happens to the job-ﬁnding rate and thus the unemployment rate. The model based
on the split-the-difference wage rule predicts almost constant unemployment. It leaves all
movements in unemployment, those that occur in recessions and those that occur at lower
frequencies, almost completely unexplained. Shimer (2005) made this important ﬁnding
about the standard DMP model.
354.2 Sticky wages in the DMP model
Some of the effort to alter the DMP model to equip it to explain the observed volatility of
unemployment has focused on wage determination. A paper of mine, Hall (2005b), makes
the simple observation that a constant wage satisﬁes the equilibrium condition, provided
that the job-seeker’s reservation wage remains below the constant wage as the economy’s
driving forces change and provided that the employer’s reservation remains above the con-
stant wage. With a constant wage, unemployment is realistically sensitive to changes in
determinants such as productivity. If productivity falls, employers ﬁnd the payoff to hiring
is lower, because the wage they pay is unchanged. They cut back on recruiting activity, the
job-ﬁnding rate falls, and unemployment rises. A decline in productivity of only a fraction
of a percent is enough to raise unemployment by the two percentage points typical of a
recession.
I call the view that emerges from this line of thought the equilibrium sticky-wage model.
It retains the appealing feature of earlier thinking about sticky wages—the fact that wages
in practice seem to have a good deal of inertia. It eliminates the call-option element of
earlier sticky-wage modeling, with its property of inefﬁcient disequilibrium. Instead, the
new approach describes a full economic equilibrium at all times. No pair of actors faces an
opportunity for a Pareto-improving reallocation. No worker loses a job because the wage
is too high, in a situation where preserving the match job would make both the worker and
the employer better off.
Although the model in Hall (2005b) embodies stickiness of the real wage, the same
line of thought rationalizes nominal stickiness as well. A rule or process that governs
the evolution of the money wage will result in a full economic equilibrium as long as it
delivers a real wage that is within the range—generally fairly wide—between the worker’s
and employer’s reservation wages. With nominal wage stickiness, monetary policy has
leverage over the real economy. New models of the labor market may help understand why
this leverage seems to be so strong in the short run and why inﬂation responds only slowly
36to monetary control.
The source of unemployment ﬂuctuations in the equilibrium sticky-wage model—and
in essentially all of the models currently emerging from the DMP tradition—is quite dif-
ferent from the source in earlier models. In the call-option models, unemployment rises as
employers discharge workers whose wages exceed the new values of their marginal prod-
ucts. Job loss is the proximate driving force of rising unemployment in a recession. In the
RBC model, employment falls in a recession because incentives have moved against work
in the market and toward time spent outside the market. The DMP models bring in a third
key determinant—the incentives for job-creation.
In the DMP class of models, employers deploy resources to attract workers. When the
payofftoemployersishigh—becausethevalueofthemarginalproductoflaborexceedsthe
wage by a fair margin—recruiting is enthusiastic and the labor market is tight. Job-seekers
ﬁnd new jobs quickly and unemployment is low. In frictional markets, such a gap always
exists—it is the employer’s share of the search capital that rewards the eventual match.
In the DMP models, the amount of the search capital and its sharing between employer
and worker are central to the determination of unemployment. Although the canonical
DMP model—Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)—views the employer as the active decision
maker and denies the job-seeker any role in choosing the resources devoted to matching,
more recent models in the DMP class take a more symmetric view.
Kennan (2005) develops an alternative theory of sticky wages in the DMP framework.
In his model, workers are heterogeneous. The job-seeker’s productivity is known to the
employer but is hidden from the job-seeker. The job-seeker makes a wage bid which the
employer either accepts or rejects; there is no opportunity for further negotiation. The
job-seeker is in the same position as a bidder in a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction. Kennan
makes assumptions that cause the job-seeker to bid a wage that is insensitive to current
conditions. Thus he reaches a sticky-wage property as a derived conclusion rather than as a
bald assumption. Kennan’s model delivers a high sensitivity of unemployment to changes
37in productivity for the same reasons I just discussed in connection with my model with
arbitrarily sticky wages.
In a more general version of the model, the job-seeker will make a higher bid when con-
ditions are better, using the general principles of ﬁrst-price auction theory. Wages will not
be completely sticky. Rather, stickiness will be a feature of certain types of distributions.
Kennan’s model is one of several new models in the DMP class that make outcomes in the
labor market depend on features of the distribution of information among participants in
the market. Tawara (2004) is an example.
Hall and Milgrom (2005) reconsider the bargaining setup in the standard DMP model.
In that setup, the job-seeker and employer take an all-or-nothing view about the bargain.
Either they make a deal immediately or they make no deal at all. In the latter case, the
worker remains unemployed and the employer loses the beneﬁt for a period of ﬁlling the
job. We point out that, in reality, people try again to make a deal, because if they walk
away, they lose the entire surplus. A basic idea of bargaining theory, introduced formally
by John Nash, is that the parties’ outside options or threat points determine the outcome
of bargaining. The standard DMP model links the outcome of the bargain directly to the
unemployment rate and other determinants of the outside options. A more realistic view
is that a job-seeker or employer dissatisﬁed with a proposed bargain will delay brieﬂy and
make a counter-proposal. Bargaining theory in this framework—Binmore, Rubinstein and
Wolinsky (1986)—shifts the emphasis from values relating to the labor market to values
and costs of delay.
Our model delivers wage rigidity by disconnecting wage bargaining from conditions
in the labor market. Once a qualiﬁed worker and an employer have found each other and
determined that they have a joint surplus, costs of delay, not outside conditions, determine
the bargain they make.
The wage does respond to productivity, but only half as much as in the standard model.
The result is a strong response of unemployment to productivity and other driving forces.
38The wage no longer has a strong equilibrating role. If productivity falls, the part of the
surplus accruing to employers falls sharply and they cut back on recruiting effort. The
labor market softens dramatically.
4.3 Unemployment volatility with ﬂexible wages
Though sticky wages make unemployment highly responsive to driving forces, other mech-
anisms may be even more important in understanding unemployment volatility. One key
issue from equation (8) is the volatility of the fraction of people separating from jobs who
become unemployed. Hall (2005c) shows that about half of departures are directly to new
jobs, without intervening unemployment. No theory of labor-market dynamics could pos-
sibly be complete without consideration of this key ﬂow. Plainly, many job-seekers are
recorded as employed, not unemployed.
Nagyp´ al (2004) combines on-the-job search with a number of other key ingredients to
achieve quite substantial volatility of unemployment. In her model, workers have different
satisfaction levels with their jobs, hidden from employers. Workers hired from unemploy-
ment are less desirable because those who form matches will have a lower average job
satisfaction. They are more likely to leave the job soon because they search for better jobs
while employed. The ﬁnal key element is a ﬁxed cost of training a new worker. A quit
deprives the employer of the value of the training cost. Nagyp´ al suggests that it is plausible
that the costs from the higher turnover of workers hired from the unemployed considerably
more than offsets the easier recruitment of the unemployed. In Nagyp´ al’s calibration, the
elasticity of the unemployment rate with respect to productivity is about ¡5. A decline of
productivity of one percent raises the unemployment rate by about 0.3 percentage points.
Thus on-the-job search and heterogeneous job satisfaction could play an important role in
the overall explanation of unemployment volatility.
Hall (2005a) considers a rather different hidden-information problem in the labor mar-
ket. A job-seeker is either qualiﬁed or not qualiﬁed for a particular job. She has information
39about her likelihood of being qualiﬁed prior to applying for a job with an employer. That
information is hidden from employers until they test and otherwise evaluate a job appli-
cant. Making an application is costly to the applicant. Job-seekers set a cutoff level of the
likelihood and apply for every job that meets the cutoff. Employers know the fraction of
applicants who are qualiﬁed and expand job openings up to the point that the surplus they
enjoy from testing and hiring the average applicant exhausts the testing cost. Job-seekers
are in equilibrium when the anticipated share of the surplus exhausts the application cost.
Once an applicant is tested and found qualiﬁed, the job-seeker and employer make the
standard Nash bargain.
Thekeydeterminantofequilibriuminthelabormarketinthemodelisthecutofflevelof
the qualiﬁcation likelihood. The equilibrium is fragile because a higher cutoff is beneﬁcial
to both job-seekers and employers. The equilibrium is at the intersection of two curves in
surplus-cutoff value space and the two curves may have almost the same slope. If the cutoff
level is low, the market is in an undesirable equilibrium—employers are receiving large
numbers of applications from unqualiﬁed workers. Employers recruit correspondingly less,
sothemarketisslack. Inaslackmarket, job-seekerssetlowcutoffsbecausejobsarehardto
ﬁnd. When the cutoff level is high, the market equilibrium induces efﬁcient self-selection.
Employers hire enthusiastically because each costly test is likely to yield a new employee
who is qualiﬁed. Workers set high cutoffs because jobs are easy to ﬁnd.
This description suggests that the equilibrium is indeterminate, which is deﬁnitely a
possibility and is not a borderline case. If the equilibrium is determinate and satisﬁes a
standard stability condition, the equilibrium is fragile—it responds sensitively to driving
forces.
Thedrivingforcesthatalterthecutoffqualiﬁcationlevelandthusthejob-ﬁndingratedo
not include productivity. Shifts in productivity alter the employer’s and worker’s surplus
in proportion so the intersection in cutoff-surplus space occurs at the same cutoff level.
The most interesting potential driving force is a property of the probability distribution
40of the signal that job-seekers receive about the likelihood of qualiﬁcation for a job. The
property is the relation between the cutoff level adopted by the job-seeker and the average
likelihood of qualiﬁcation of applicants employing the rule of applying for every job where
the information conveys a likelihood at least as high as the cutoff. The latter controls the
employer’s payoff from testing. The elasticity of the ratio of the two is key. If the elasticity
is one, equilibrium is indeterminate. Small changes in the elasticity are a potent driving
force for large ﬂuctuations in the job-ﬁnding rate and other aspects of the labor market.
4.4 Sources of recessions
Whenaskedtodescribeaparticularrecessionorrecessionsingeneral, thepracticalmacroe-
conomist will tell a story that focuses on the collapse of purchases of certain categories of
products—producer and consumer durables. For example, all practical accounts of the re-
cession of 2001 emphasize the huge decline in high-tech investment. In earlier recessions,
declines in home-building were prominent features. On the other hand, more theoretically
inclined macroeconomists tend to take a decline in productivity—or at least a pause in the
normal growth of productivity—as the central driving force. New ideas discussed here may
help bridge this important gap between practical and theoretical macroeconomists.
Some of the new models emphasize the shapes of distributions of hidden information.
In the self-selection and on-the-job-search models, employers make decisions knowing
the shape of a distribution of job-seeker characteristics, but not the hidden value for a
particular job-seeker. In Kennan’s model, a job-seeker makes a wage demand without
knowing the employer’s reservation wage based on hidden match productivity. This type
of model opens the possibility of subtle driving forces involving changes in the shapes of
those distributions.
Changes in distributions may provide the needed link between the practical macroe-
conomist’s notion of a recession and the class of theories considered in this paper. The data
show unambiguously that construction, durables, and non-durables manufacturing suffer
41large employment reductions in recessions, while other industries shrink only slightly or
continue to grow—see Hall (2005c).
The older models in the DMP tradition do not provide an immediate analysis linking
changes in the industry composition of employment to the aggregate unemployment rate.
The rise in unemployment in a recession is the result of diminished job-creation among
employers in general. If recessions were periods of generally higher re-allocation of labor,
thetraditionalDMPmodelwouldpredictrisingrecruitingeffortinrecessions, asemployers
in other industries took advantage of the availability of workers released from shrinking
industries. But the data show amazing declines in recruiting effort in recessions—help-
wanted advertising usually falls in half from peak to trough.
The new additions to the DMP class of models may offer some hope of connecting
declines in manufacturing and construction to the dramatic rise in unemployment that ac-
companies every recession. For example, the events leading to a large decline in employ-
ment in durables might shift the economy from the favorable equilibrium described in the
self-selection model to the unfavorable one. In the favorable equilibrium, the applicants
for a job opening are largely people who know they are qualiﬁed. Employers waste few
resources screening out unsuitable applicants. They are correspondingly enthusiastic about
creating jobs, so the market is tight. A subtle change in the distribution of the signal that
workers receive about their likelihood of qualiﬁcation can move the equilibrium perversely.
Applicants, ﬁnding it difﬁcult to locate any job, apply for jobs where they are less likely to
be qualiﬁed. Employers are overwhelmed by applicants and dissipate resources screening
out the unqualiﬁed ones. The market becomes slack, with high unemployment.
In Kennan’s model, the shape of the distribution of match productivity, a variable ob-
served only by the employer, has two key roles. Job-seekers know the distribution but not
the realization, so they solve a wage-bidding problem deﬁned by the distribution. Firms
earn an informational rent on the difference between the productivity realization and the
wage bid. Shifts in the distribution induced by changes in the composition of employment
42might result in changes in the rent.
The new research offers some new mechanisms that may advance understanding of
both the business cycle and the important sub-cyclical movements of unemployment and
other key variables. Notice that none of the driving forces of unemployment ﬂuctuations
discussed here are explicitly transitory. They do not disappear after ﬁrms and workers get
around to changing prices and wages. They can explain the highly persistent sub-cyclical
movements that elude the call-option sticky-price model and the neoclassical model.
My purpose here is to advocate the new models as useful additions to our toolbox of
macro ﬂuctuation studies. I do not suggest that we can dispense with the call-option sticky-
price model. In addition, all macroeconomists should be aware of the importance of ﬂuc-
tuations in productivity and exogenous spending, operating through neoclassical channels,
in ﬂuctuations at every frequency.
4.5 *-Variables in future models
Although the idea of *-variables as the equilibrium of a friction-free economy does not
seem to be useful, either in theory or in practice, something like *-variables may be im-
plicit in future macro models. Dynamic systems often have representations in terms of
adjustment processes in which current values of variables adjust toward *-values. My re-
marks in this paper are not intended as a criticism of that type of representation. Rather,
I believe that these representations depend critically on the assumptions of the underlying
model. For example, the assumption that sellers grant call options to buyers is central to
the standard sticky-price model in use today. New models based on different and perhaps
more realistic assumptions have different representations. Further, and most important, all
models imply that the *-variables are in constant motion and extraordinarily difﬁcult to
infer in real time.
435 Modeling Real Returns
Research has been active in developing models that attempt to match the puzzling facts
about real returns. The failures of the standard model of the joint behavior of real returns
and consumption growth are well known.
Much of the research has focused on basic aspects of the failure of the standard model.
These are the high average return earned in the stock market and the low average return for
treasury bills. The standard model sees both of these investments are having low ﬁnancial
risk—their payoffs are not systematically low during bad times, as signaled by low con-
sumption. The reason is that consumption is not terribly volatile. It grows a bit in most
years and shrinks only in the rare severe recession. Consumption has not declined, year
over year, in the past 25 years and declined only twice, in 1973-1974 and 1979-1980, since
1948. Research that measures risk by consumption growth in the past 50 years ﬁnds little
demand for insurance against risk and little aversion to risky assets, such as stocks, because
bad times have not occurred. It is a paradox that stocks have returned so much more over
that period than treasury bills, because investors should not care about the variability of
returns to stocks.
One idea proposed by many authors over the years is that investors apply a subjective
probability distribution about future consumption that puts some weight on true disasters,
even though none has occurred in our lifetimes. A simple version is that people know that
consumption fell by 20 percent from 1929 to 1933. Even after 50 years of smooth sailing,
investors might put some probability on a repetition of the disaster and know as well that,
far from providing insurance against the disaster, the stock market yielded negative returns
over the same period. But this explains only a small fraction of the gap between stock
and treasury bill returns. Probability distributions that permit consumption to fall to a
billionth of its current value are capable of explaining the gap. Whatever event has this
effect must leave the federal government able to meet its treasury-bill obligations, else the
equity premium would not prevail.
44Though thousands of papers have tried to explain the equity premium and hundreds
more appear every year, it remains a puzzle as far as I am concerned. The answer may lie
in non-standard or behavioral principles, though I am not aware of any convincing research
on this point to date.
Other aspects of returns remain equally puzzling. First, the volatility of ﬁnancial re-
turns is much higher than models predict. One of the important assets in equation (5) is
productive capital—plant and equipment. Figures 7 and 8 show that the return to capital,
measured either as a residual or as the marginal product of the Cobb-Douglas technology, is
quite smooth. I have already noted that consumption growth is smooth. The non-ﬁnancial
variables obey the equation quite well. Further, the general-equilibrium model I discussed
earlier, in Section 2.2, can match the volatility of the return to capital and consumption
growth.
Financial returns are quite another matter. The volatility of the real return to treasury
bills should be unambiguously lower than the volatility of capital, according to the standard
model. Markets determine the nominal bill rate in advance—the only expectation error
arises from small errors in forming expectations in inﬂation over the coming year. But, in
fact, Figure 6 shows that the treasury bill rate is rather more volatile than either measure
of the return to capital. Moreover, while the average level of the return to capital remains
roughly constant, the real treasury-bill rate is low for long periods and then high for long
periods. Its low-frequency movements are paradoxical in the light of the standard model.
This topic has attracted almost no research.
The volatility of the return to debt is nothing compared to the volatility of the stock
market. Shiller (1981) showed that the stock market varies far too much to ﬁt a model
in which investors discount future dividends at a constant rate. Though many of us have
suspected ever since that this result supports the hypothesis of excess volatility, subsequent
commentary made it clear that variations in discount rates need to be brought into the anal-
ysis. Working this out takes us back to equation (5). Excess volatility of the stock market
45shows up as movements of stock-market returns that are inconsistent with the restrictions in
that equation. Although research has consistently rejected those restrictions, the potential
sources of the rejections are numerous. Irrational investors are only one. Variation over
time in the ki parameters is an explanation potentially consistent with standard ideas about
rationality.
A totally different line of attack suggests excess volatility of ﬁnancial markets. By
buying a suitable portfolio of equity and debt claims on a corporation, an investor can
synthesize ownership of a share of the corporation’s real assets. The return to the portfolio
should be the same, period by period, as the return to those assets. In fact, the return to the
ﬁnancial portfolio differs wildly from the return to underlying corporate assets, both in its
year-to-year movements and in its volatility. The ﬁnancial claim on the real assets leads a
completely separate life from the assets themselves, both in terms of levels of value and in
terms of annual returns.
In some ways, the most telling evidence of the failure of our basic ideas about ﬁnan-
cial markets is the difference between the value of corporations in ﬁnancial markets and
the apparent value of the capital the corporations own. Figure 11, taken from Hall (2001),
shows the ratio of the market value of all ﬁnancial claims (equity and debt outstanding net
of equity and debt held) to the estimated value of the business assets of U.S. non-ﬁnancial
corporations. This measure is Tobin’s q. The ratio has huge sub-cyclical movements that
do not ﬁt any simple theory. Tobin offered the hypothesis that q ﬂuctuates because corpora-
tions earn rents on capital made temporarily scarce or plentiful by adjustment costs. But the
costs implied by the magnitude and persistence in the ﬁgure are far beyond the plausible.
My work suggested the corporations were accumulating intangibles, which, if added to the
denominator of q, would result in a measure that stayed closer to its logical value of one.
But this view fails to explain the period from the early 1970s to the late 1980s when q was
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Figure 11. Ratio of the Market Value of Corporations to the Value of Corporate
Assets (Tobin’s q)
476 Concluding Remarks
Discussions of practical macroeconomics, especially those relating to monetary policy, rely
heavily on three concepts: potential GDP, the natural rate of unemployment, and the nor-
mal real interest rate. To measure potential GDP, practitioners use a statistical smoothing
approach, such as the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter, or a neoclassical growth model. The smooth-
ing approach makes little sense in view of the evidence that a fully neoclassical economy,
buffeted by changing rates of productivity growth and changing levels of exogenous spend-
ing, does not evolve at all smoothly. In fact, the evidence shows that most of the variation
in real GDP growth over short and medium horizons arises from productivity growth. The
approach based on a neoclassical growth model enters the thicket of controversy over the
proper speciﬁcation of a real business-cycle model. Potential GDP is not a useful guide to
making monetary policy.
The U.S. unemployment rate is a stationary variable. In that respect, the idea of a nat-
ural rate is on ﬁrmer ground than is the idea of potential GDP. But the natural rate cannot
be a constant, else one would be required to believe that the economy spends long periods,
such as the 1970s and 1980s, with unemployment above the natural rate, and other long
periods below the natural rate. Because the neoclassical model has zero unemployment,
the model provides no guidance about variations in the natural rate. Modern theories of
unemployment say nothing about the natural rate either—they regard every observed level
of unemployment, whether in a recession, boom, or normal period, as a full economic equi-
librium. These theories are unitary. They do not separate unemployment into equilibrium
and cyclical components. Again, the natural unemployment rate is not a useful concept in
the execution of monetary policy.
New thinking about unemployment departs from the framework in Friedman (1968), in
that Friedman distinguished between the natural rate and the actual rate of unemployment.
He viewed the natural rate as varying over time, based on “...the actual structural charac-
teristics of the labor and commodity markets, including market imperfections, stochastic
48variability in demands and supplies, the cost of gathering information about job vacancies
and labor availabilities, the costs of mobility, and so on” (p. 8). The new theories see those
forces as determining the actual unemployment rate. Nothing in new thinking has shaken
Friedman’s basic message, however, that unemployment is invariant to the monetary policy
regime. In that sense, natural-rate theory is thoroughly embedded in all modern thought.
Thesituationwithrespecttotherealinterestrateissimilar. Wicksell’snaturalornormal
interest rate, as distinguished from the actual market rate, is not a feature of modern macro-
ﬁnance models. Each of the many real interest rates in the economy moves differently—
they do not obey even the relatively unrestrictive principles of basic ﬁnance models. We
are not equipped to judge when monetary policy is neutral in terms of interest rates.
None of these conclusions stands in the way of intelligent monetary policy-making.
Under Alan Greenspan’s stewardship, the U.S. has achieved remarkably low levels of in-
ﬂation and inﬂation volatility, despite the lack of real reference points. We do not need
to know the GDP gap, the unemployment gap, or the neutral real interest rate, to keep the
price level near constancy.
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